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Abstract
The aim of this study was to investigate and present the most prominent determinants of
profitability of microfinance institutions (MFI) in Sub-Saharan Africa. Creating an empir-
ical framework including variables concluded to be of protruding effect to profitability and
adapting it to the microfinance field, we are able to isolate the determinants which play
the central role in this emerging market. The model is applied to a dataset of MFIs in
Sub-Saharan Africa during the period 2005-2014, which result in estimations showing that
MFI specific variables, such as credit risk, cost management and size are important factors
in explaining why some succeed while others fail. We find some, yet sparse, convincing
evidence of macroeconomic determinants significantly affecting MFI profitability, although
we acknowledge our model may be limited in its ability to capture the complexity of the
economic environment in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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1 Introduction
In 1990 Nobel laureate Robert E. Lucas wrote the article “Why Doesn’t capital Flow from
Rich to Poor Countries?” basing that exact question on calculations showing that the
marginal product of capital was 58 times higher in India compared to the United States at
that time. Basic economic theory tells us two things relevant to this matter. First, the law
of diminishing returns, introduced by early economists such as Smith and Ricardo, implies
that the marginal product of capital will be decreasing as the capital stock is increasing.
Second, economic rationality implies investments and capital flows will always seek out
the allocation of capital which yields the highest possible return. When compiling these
theories with the findings of Lucas (1990) there is a clear discrepancy. We would expect
capital to flow at unprecedented rates from the western world into developing economies
in search of higher returns, whilst likely contributing to stronger economic development
in the receiving country. However, in the development up until recently this has not been
the case. The majority of loans in the poorer parts of the world are administered by local
loan sharks at very high rates of interest and very short maturity periods. Furthermore,
this leads us to observe many developing countries struggling with low degrees of capital
intensity and credit crunches making it virtually impossible for them to create opportunities
for entrepreneurs and businessmen.
The most thriving type of projects aimed at tackling this issue yet, are the microfi-
nance institutions (MFIs). Introduced successfully by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh,
today hosting credit to over 7 million clients (Grameen, 2008) and enabling a larger part
of the world’s population to access credit. Thereby making possible investments in the
development of small scale businesses. However, thus far a successful concept, the prob-
lems with MFIs have been considerable. Banerjee & Duflo (2012) point out problems of
subsidy dependence and high default rates as issues of the industry. There are also a few
fundamental problems with investments, and foremost loans to the poor. First, originating
from the fact that the large mass of the poor in need of credit require comparatively small
loans, the cost associated with administering micro loans has in many cases exceeded both
the prospective earnings of the bank as well as the total amount of the loan. Second, in-
stitutional strength and political stability have not been sufficient to guarantee the safety
of investments made in many of the affected regions. Weak ownership rights and an in-
sufficient rule of law often cause high default rates and thereby large credit losses. Third,
and to some extent a supposition, a large portion of investments and loan programs intro-
duced to the poor up to this point have been part of aid programs, governmental projects
or non-profit organizations (NPO) (Banerjee & Duflo, 2012), which cause developmental
aspects to play a more central role, thereby overriding economic sustainability.
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In more recent years private firms and investment banks have started to take more of
an interest in this type of investing. Deutsche Bank, Citibank and others have developed
an investment product for their clients making it possible for investors from the developed
world to take part and benefit from the development of a credit sector in the poorer part
of the world (Reille & Sananikone, 2007; Deutsche Bank, 2014; Citigroup, 2005; Credit-
Suisse, 2016). First introduced as a part of their socially responsible investment (SRI)
program it now develops into a new area of return seeking asset management. Aspects
such as strong profitability, high interest rates and short maturity are put forward as
factors which vouch for high return on invested capital (Dieckmann, 2007). The potential
social development in addition to the raised profits introduces an opportunity of a double
bottom line in this industry for a lot of companies. The social aspect is a strong marketing
incentive which is now grabbing the attention of more and more actors in the market.
Working in symbiosis the SRI programs provide a value for the recipients, whilst it also
helps the benefactor in branding themselves as a responsible corporation. Furthermore,
although microfinance is not immune to the effects of the world economy targeted by
traditional banking, it is sometimes considered to be disconnected in the sense that the
businesses in need of microcredit are usually engaged in areas where demand is relatively
unaffected by the overall economic development. In this sense, microfinance provides a
great diversification opportunity for investors looking for investment opportunities outside
the developed world.
While parts of the western world still struggle with the aftermath of the 2008 financial
crisis and investors worry about the stagnating growth of the Chinese economy, we find
that of the World Bank’s top 12 prospected growing economies, half of them are found in
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (World Bank Group, 2016). SSA has yet to see an expansion
of microfinance equal to what has been observed in some countries in Latin America
(Mexico) and Asia (India). Yet, it is currently growing rapidly, with expected growth
of the microfinance industry at 15-20% in 2015 (Etzensperger, 2015). MFI growth in
combination with commercial bank profits in SSA being higher than anywhere else in the
world (Flamini et al., 2009), vouch for economic prospects of these types of investments
to be highly advantageous.
The aggregate conclusion we observe is; in the developing world there is still a rather
large unexplored market for credit with potential returns reaching manifold of what is
observed in the developed world. The attendant question to this matter is what actually
marks a successful MFI program and how do we determine what they are? Like any in-
vestment decision, the investor wants to acquire as broad and accurate information about
the potential investment as possible. However, research and analysis conducted on MFIs
with a focus on microfinance as an investment perspective is scarce. Few studies explore
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the return or profitability aspects and even fewer investigate the subject from the per-
spective of the investor. With previous research having primarily focused on outreach and
poverty-reducing aspects of microfinance, the marketability of the concept as an invest-
ment opportunity remains rather unexplored. The lack of research on this aspect in turn
reduces the possibility for investors to assimilate relevant information for their decisions.
Likely resulting in skepticism towards the investment opportunity from parties which do
not have the financial or administrative possibility to investigate the subject themselves.
Our objective is to shine light on the investment perspectives of MFIs and thereby
create material for investors and future studies. Our hope is that this will lead to further
investigation of the opportunity that microfinance can be both financially beneficial for the
investor, as well as create development opportunities in the receiving countries. To achieve
this objective the aim of this paper consists of two parts. First, we aspire to identify the
primary determinants of profitability as measured by return on assets as well as return on
equity in microfinance institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Second, having determined the
mark of a successful MFI in SSA, we want to pinpoint which type of organization is best
suited, and perhaps most needed, in the microfinance industry in SSA.
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 will present a
brief review of the literature covering determinants of other financial institutions, and to
some extent also that of institutions operating in the chosen region of study. Section 3
introduces the theoretical framework and methodology which will be applied in the study.
Section 4 presents the data and variables included in the model. Section 5 presents the
main results of the study and discusses some potential implications. Section 6 provides
concluding remarks and provides some recommendations and food for thought concerning
the future development of the investment industry engaged in MFI projects.
2 Literature review
This section provides a brief non-exhaustive review of previous literature of relevance to
our study. We have encountered literature conducting comprehensive bank profitability
studies as well as in depth analysis of factors specific to microfinance. However, we have
been unsuccessful in locating research with the aim of analyzing MFIs as an investment ve-
hicle. Literature of relevance has therefore been a combination of performance analysis of
commercial banks, which have provided us with an understanding of how to measure prof-
itability in combination with specific MFI orientated studies, allowing us to better adapt
our study to the field of microfinance. When conducting similar studies, the literature
typically considers two aspects of determinants; specific characteristics of each financial
institution and macroeconomic characteristics under which the financial institutions oper-
ate. The literature review will consequently be structured accordingly.
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One of the most frequently observed components of institution-specific characteristics
is risk taking. Financial theory tells us that accepting a higher level of risk could potentially
result in higher rewards. Risk is typically split up into three subcategories in the literature;
credit risk, i.e. risk on loans, diversification, i.e. risk involved with relying on one or few
income generating activities and financial risk, i.e. risk in the funding structure of the
institution. Previous studies have examined the effects of credit risk on profitability with
varying results. Dietrich & Wanzenried (2014) discovered a strongly significant negative
effect of credit risk on profitability looking at data from 118 countries, as was also the
case of Miller & Noulas (1997) study on profitability in the United States. On the other
hand, analyzing profitability in commercial banks in Sub-Saharan Africa, Flamini et al.
(2009) showed a positive significant effect of credit risk. Flamini et al. (2009) also found
the ratio of net interest revenues in relation to other operating income to be negative
and highly significant. Thus implying institutions would benefit from diversifying their
activities. Demirgu¨c-Kunt & Huizinga (1998) found evidence in their study of banks
from 80 countries over an eight year period that banks with higher ratio of non-interest
earning assets to total assets were less profitable than their counterparts. Whereas interest
earning income is potentially riskier than other operating income due to the possibility of
default, it can however pay off in higher revenue. In terms of risk involved in the funding
structure, highly leveraged institutions can generate larger profits by increasing their gross
loan portfolio which earns interest income. Meanwhile they are at greater risk due to
the aggressive debt funded growth approach, which will generate higher interest expenses.
While interest income comes with a degree of uncertainty, debt payments do not and could
result in large losses when interest income is declining. Studies have shown an endogenous
growth approach to be more beneficial for profitability (Berger 1995; Flamini et al., 2009;
Athanasoglou et al., 2008).
Several studies have examined the role of market concentration on profitability in
banking businesses. The findings of Short (1979) indicate concentration has a role in
explaining profitability in banks, although the relatively small coefficient levels in his results
conclude a large change in concentration would be required in order to notice a change
in profitability. Bourke (1988) as well as Molyneux & Thornton (1992) find evidence
supporting a positive effect of market concentration on profitability.
Given the current development of the MFI market, the different types of actors in the
market is an interesting parameter to the profitability of different programs. First, while a
rising amount of private, corporate controlled actors are making an entrance in the market
there are still a substantial amount of NGOs, non-profits and similar types of private or
government owned institutions involved in the MFI industry. The literature thoroughly
discusses the question of whether profitability of a company in general is to any extent
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related with the ownership structure. Short (1979) found little support of the theory that
privately-owned companies produce higher economic profits while Molyneux & Thornton
(1992) find there to be little evidence supporting any correlation between ownership and
profitability at all. Drawing partly from these earlier studies, Delis (2006) investigates the
effect ownership has on bank profitability. The results also found ownership to have an
insignificant effect on profitability. However, as many MFI programs were developed in
an attempt to reduce poverty it may be speculated that the ownership directives of those
institutions are more directed towards development and less so towards profit.
One of the major issues of MFIs to date has been to create enough efficiency in a large
and otherwise inert organization in order to make micro loans profitable. In this aspect
cost management becomes a highly important parameter. The system of MFIs requires
administrative costs to be very small on a per loan basis which is why the adaption of a
cost efficient system is expected to play a large role in the success of an MFI. Different
perspectives on the topic of cost management have previously been discussed by Hartarska
(2005) and Flamini et al. (2009), also highlighting the importance of operating efficiency.
The aggregate conclusion is that cost management does play a role in the profitability of the
studied institutions. Roberts (2013) investigates whether the microfinance sector benefits
from more MFIs with a stronger profit minded approach, following the recent debates of the
increase in profit oriented microfinance institutions. His results point towards the fact that
for-profit MFIs provide loans with higher interest rates than their non-profit counterparts.
However, as the costs of for-profit MFIs are also higher, in part due to greater salary costs
for highly paid executives, their profits are not higher. He highlights the importance of
cost management in order to provide lower interest rates to clients, not only in order to
be profitable but also to contribute to the MFI community by providing cheaper credit to
poor clients.
The general perception of increasing size is that with larger size comes greater op-
portunities for specialization and thereby efficiency and higher profits, Marshall & Weiss
(1967). In contrast, the problem of larger banks related with engagements in MFIs has
been that large administrations and complex control systems has made it uneconomical
to development any MFI programs reaching beyond the point of CSR Banerjee & Duflo,
2012).
Macroeconomic variables are introduced among those studies in the literature which
concern cross-country analysis in order to capture and control for the differing economic
and institutional environments. Strength of domestic institutions and rule of law are
commonly discussed as important factors of economic growth and development. Demirgu¨c-
Kunt & Huizinga (1999) highlight that the strength of institutions may play a role in
determining efficiency on a company level. When debating the topic of institutions in
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a developing context, like that of many SSA countries, links are often made between
ownership rights, political stability and rule of law and their importance in creating a
favorable business climate. Flamini et al. (2009) discuss the importance of institutions in
SSA specifically with respect to profitability in the banking sector. However, in their study
they are unable to find a statistically significant effect of institutional quality. Ahlin, et al.
(2011) analysis on MFIs shows the importance of including the macroeconomic perspective
when conducting a cross country comparison of MFIs. Their findings include GDP growth
affecting performance, attributing the increased performance to lower default rates which
arise from GDP growth. Demirgu¨c-Kunt & Huizinga (1999) found evidence of economic
development along with higher inflation positively affecting profits and institutional factors
were found to be of importance, especially in developing countries.
3 Methodology
3.1 Simple linear regression model
To estimate the determinants of profitability we will begin by introducing a simple linear
regression model. Ordinary least squares (OLS) is applied to our unbalanced panel data.
The model in its general form is presented as follows:
Pit = C +
B∑
b=1
βbX
b
it +
M∑
m=1
βmX
m
it + εit
Where C is a constant term, Xbit are the institution specific explanatory variables and X
m
it
are the macroeconomic control variables. Furthermore, dividing the institution specific and
macroeconomic determinants into their respective components derives the simple linear
regression which will provide baseline estimates of profitability determinants:
Pit = β0 + β1CREDit + β2MIXit + β3LEVit + β4CONCit + β5BANKit
+ β6NBFIit + β7NGOit + β8UNIONit + β9COSTit + β10SIZEit + β11INSTit
+ β12GDPit + β13DEVit + β14RATEit + εit
Where Pit is profitability of institution i at time t measured by return on assets/return
on equity and β0 is a constant. CREDit is the credit risk of institutions defined by
the write-off ratio; MIXit is the diversification risk calculated from the institutions net
interest income in relation to other operating income, LEVit is the financial risk measured
by the institutions equity to assets ratio; CONCit is the market concentration calculated
using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index; COSTit represents cost management where the
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logarithm of each institution’s total operating expenses is used as a proxy; SIZEit is
the size of the MFI measured by the logarithm of gross loan portfolio; INSTit is the
institutional strength of the firms registered native country measured by a self-compiled
index based on the World Bank ”Ease of Doing Business Index”, GDPit is the cyclical
output effect controlled through the GDP growth of the primary operating country; DEVit
is the economic development represented by the GDP per capita measure of the operational
country; RATEit is the real interest rate in the primary operational country. Finally, εit
is the idiosyncratic error term including the unobserved effect.
3.2 Extented model
The simple linear model is extended by including the square of SIZEit to investigate
whether MFIs in SSA exhibit inefficiencies with increasing scale. Furthermore, an interac-
tion term between real interest rates and financial risk is also included to enrich the model.
The variables are added to the simple linear model to produce the extended model:
Pit = β0 + β1CREDit + β2MIXit + β3LEVit + β4LEV RATEit + β5CONCit
+ β6BANKit + β7NBFIit + β8NGOit + β9UNIONit + β10COSTit + β11SIZEit
+ β12SIZE
2
it + β13INSTit + β14GDPit + β15DEVit + β16RATEit + εit
Where LEV RATEit is an interaction term between financial risk and real interest rate
(i.e. LEVit*RATEit) and SIZE
2
it is the logarithm of gross loan portfolio squared.
3.3 Pooled OLS
The simple and extended model described above will be run in three different econometric
environments. The first of which is a pooled OLS approach. The pooled OLS model
leaves the unobserved effect αi (i.e. all unobserved factors affecting profitability that do
not change over time) in the idiosyncratic error term εit (i.e. all time-varying unobserved
factors affecting profitability), thus creating a composite error term defined as follows
(Wooldridge, 2008;2009):
vit = αi + εit
Since αi is a time-constant unobserved effect, it creates serial correlation between the vit
terms over time. This serial correlation can be quite significant and the estimates using
pooled OLS will therefore be incorrect, as will the test statistics that follow (ibid.). In
spite of this fact, pooled OLS results are included to provide baseline estimates and will
allow us to analyze the bias created by the serial correlation when comparing it with the
following two environments.
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3.4 Random effects vs fixed effects model
The key factor to consider when determining between a random effects model and a fixed
effects model is whether it is reasonable to assume that the unobserved effect αi is un-
correlated with all of the explanatory variables (Wooldridge,2008;2009). Elaborating the
argument we find it unlikely that this is the case. Potential correlation might be found in
differing regulation standards in terms of capital flows in and out of the observed countries,
where this could affect the availability to credit thus limiting the MFIs ability to leverage
their business. Consequently, higher leverage among MFIs might in part be attributed to
less restrictive capital controls. The fixed effects model allows correlation between αi and
the explanatory variables for any t which eliminates the possibility to include any time
constant variables (ibid.). Consequently, the legal status dummy indicating institution
type will be omitted in the fixed effects model as it does not vary over the observed period.
Whereas this opportunity is still possible under a random effects model, we do not find it
reasonable to assume there is no correlation between the time-constant unobserved effect
and all of the explanatory variables. Therefore, we assume the fixed effects model to be
better suited for this study.
To formally test this hypothesis, a Hausman specification test (1978) will be applied.
The test compares the results from a random effects model and a fixed effects model and
tests the null hypothesis that differences in coefficients are not systematic. A rejection of
the null hypothesis would point in favor of a fixed effects model. Failure to reject would
either imply differences between the two are insignificant and therefore either one could
be used, or that variation in the sample of the fixed effects model is large enough making
it impossible to prove practical significance (ibid.).
To summarize, the methodology we intend to apply uses two different regressions (simple
model and extended model), run in three different environments (pooled OLS, random ef-
fects and fixed effects). Pooled OLS results will be included as a baseline estimator and to
analyze the bias following the random effects and fixed effects models. With the previous
argument in mind, the discussion of the results will be based on the estimates from the
fixed effects model as we assume it to be the most reliable in allowing us to achieve the
goal of our study.
3.5 Validity of the model
Being a study of market movements and business structures in the developing world we
are also bound to deal with issues of endogeneity due to omitted variables which we have
been unable to include following either limitations in the data or restrictions of a feasible
model. It is likely that macroeconomic variables concerning capital controls and restric-
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tions of inflow of foreign money will have an effect on the development of invested-funded
MFIs. We may assume that these types of controls can affect our measure of institutional
stability and even the leverage of some MFIs because of a potential lack of capital that
may occur. A possible dependence between the observed variables and what may be lo-
cated in the unobserved term in our estimation in either direction may cause a correlation
of unobserved effects resulting in biased estimation results. Isolating variables completely
in a macroeconomic environment is difficult because of the obvious correlation between
aspects compounded on a macro-level and the characteristics of the studied market and
vice versa. Similarly, in this study there may be factors included in the unobserved term
that have some effect on the observed variables. For example, market factors which have
an effect on competition, regulations or business climate of one market are likely to have
some effect on the performance of firms even though they are not clearly linked in the
same specific market. Furthermore, because of the lack of a clear link between the aspects
or variables, it might not be obvious to include an additional variable with relation to the
studied subject. In this study the intention has been to include variables which may cover
a larger part of the market aspect intended to be investigated whilst at the same time
creating a lucid model. The weaknesses presented above are part of a given complex of
problems when conducting a study on a regional level with as comprehensive data as the
one analyzed in this study. We have aimed to tackle this issue by including as consolidating
variables as possible of the studied area as well as include the endogeneity aspect in our
interpretation of the estimation results.
4 Data
Our dataset consists of unbalanced panel data from 22 countries1 in Sub-Saharan Africa
during the ten year period of 2005-20142. The dataset consist of 502 observations from
171 different MFIs categorized into four separate subsets of MFI types: Bank, Non-
Governmental Organization, Non-Bank Financial Institution and Credit Union /Coop-
erative. In total, the dataset includes observations from 106 banks, 127 NGOs, 208 NBFIs
and 61 Credit Union/Cooperatives. The following part of this section is a dicussion of
the data validity and a description of the variables which will be used to analyze the de-
terminants of profitability in microfinance institutions in SSA. The description includes
a detailed overview of how each specific variable will be modeled and how we expect the
variable to influence our profitability variables.
1See table IV in appendix for full list of included countries. Countries not included have been removed
due to insufficient data.
2Period was chosen based on available data.
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4.1 Validity of the data
The dataset used in this study is self-compiled using data from two primary sources. First,
the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) provides data on MFI specific variables
and factors connected to that industry in particular. Originating out of Washington, USA,
with financing from CGAP, Bill and Melinda Gates foundation and Citi Foundation among
others, the non-profit organization focuses on distributing reliant data on MFIs and has
provided data to several similar studies. MIX being financed by strong international aid
and investment entities and being used by eminent researchers and policymakers we are
confident in the reliance on this data collection. Second, the macroeconomic variables used
in the analyzed dataset are collected from the World Bank database. As the World Bank
represents one of the major sources of international data collection, we are confident in
the validity of this data. Furthermore, because the data used in this study is collected by
entities which are independent from any specific influence we assume bias of the raw data
not to be an issue.
MIX defines a microfinance institution based on the size of loans they provide, thus
MFIs included in our dataset do not necessarily focus their business exclusively on mi-
crofinance. Although a part of this possibility is captured by diversification risk variable
which will be described in the section below, not all of the variation in the firms profits
may originate from microfinance related business. The most prominently recurring issue
when compiling the dataset was missing observations for certain variables among MFIs.
This issue originated partly from the fact that we set no transparency requirements on
MFIs included in the study. The approach resulted in both positive and negative aspects;
by allowing all potential MFI actors to be included, more observations in our dataset
could be recorded as well as increasing diversification of the sample. On the other hand,
missing observations of certain variables led to a high dropout rate which resulted in a
skewed representation in the distribution. In addition, arising from the issue of exclusion
of observations and the inability to control for all factors which may affect the result, we
can assume that the dropout of some observations is to an extent correlated with the id-
iosyncratic errors of those observations. An example would be a change of ownership or
legal requirements in terms of reporting practices, leading to data potentially not being
available in areas where it was previously included. The result of this concern is that the
remaining sample section may produce biased estimators. Despite the demarcated nature
of our study we have been able to find widespread data allowing us to implement a broad
approach without having to adapt our model to fit the data in any greater extent.
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4.2 Dependent variables
Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) will both be used as measures of
profitability. While the two measurements are similar, they do exhibit some differences.
ROE is a good base measurement of how well management is able to translate shareholder
equity into profits. However, ROE does not take into account the leverage in the business.
Assets financed by debt can potentially translate into higher profits given that management
has more to work with. A business funded to a large extent by debt could present high
net income, and thus also an impressively high ROE whereas ROA might be significantly
lower, highlighting the need to analyze both metrics when measuring profitability.
4.3 Independent variables
4.3.1 MFI-specific determinants
As a proxy for credit risk, we will be using the write-off ratio3 of the observed MFIs.
Given the high risk environments the microfinance institutions operate in, we expect the
institutions which are able to withstand the possibility of an increase in loan loss rate to
benefit in terms of higher profits following the higher risk they are willing to accept.
We will be using the same proxy as Flamini et al. (2009) to represent diversification
risk, i.e. net interest revenues/other operating income. Continuing on the previous argu-
ment for credit risk, we expect the high risk environment we are studying to benefit those
with a higher degree of interest earning income.
To capture the risk involved in the funding structure, the ratio of shareholder equity
in relation to total assets will be used. Our prediction regarding the effect of financial risk
is a positive effect on profitability as we believe the larger ratio of assets management has
to work with will be beneficial as they can gain more income through increased lending. As
ROE does not include the potential higher leverage in an institution, the leverage measure
will not be included when using ROA as the dependent variable.
A Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) will be constructed to describe market concen-
tration in the microfinance industry in each country. The HHI index is used to depict an
aspect of the market climate in studies of company performance on a macro level. The cal-
culation of the index is described thoroughly by S.A Rhoades (1993); a brief introduction
will be presented below.
3http://www.mixmarket.org/about/faqs/glossary - Write-off ratio is calculated as the amount of loans
removed from the loan portfolio once they have been recognized as noncollectable in relation to the gross
loan portfolio of the same period.
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We calculate the index by squaring the market share4 of each MFI and then summing the
squares for each market. Algebraically, the index is calculated as follows:
HHI =
n∑
i=1
(
MSit)
2
Where n is the number of firms in the market in each respective country and MSit is the
market share of firm i measured in whole percentages at time t. Consequently, the index
will range between 0 and 10,000; 10,000 indicating a perfectly concentrated monopolistic
market, which would present a single firm with 100% of the market. A small number
however, indicates a greater number of smaller and more equal firms and illustrates a
highly competitive market. The market share of each firm was calculated based on the
total amount of gross loan portfolio in the nation before observations were excluded due
to missing data on certain variables.
In order to include the effect differing directives among institution type may have on
the profitability of an institution we will include dummy variables describing the different
types of organizations in our data set. Institutions are divided into bank (BANK), non-
bank financial institution (NBFI), cooperative/credit union (UNION) and non-governmental
organization (NGO). We expect to observe a higher level of profit orientation among the
banking institutions and hence expect a positive coefficient for BANK5.
The variable operating expense is designated as proxy for operating efficiency. Oper-
ating expenses includes all costs related to operations including personnel costs, financial
costs and administrative expenses6. We expect this variable to report a negative causation
on profitability, i.e. higher costs are disadvantageous.
The logarithm of each MFIs gross loan portfolio is used to proxy MFI size which will
give us a good idea of their operational capacity. We expect to find evidence of economies
of scale, thus suggesting a positive causation on profitability. The logarithm of squared
gross loan portfolio will also be introduced to capture the possibility of diseconomies of
scale.
4Market share is calculated by using the share of each MFIs gross loan portfolio in relation to the total
gross loan portfolio in the respective country.
5When running the regression using a fixed effects model, variables which do not change over time are
already controlled for. Therefore, the variables for institution type are not shown in the output.
6Mix market, “Glossary”, 2012, http://www.mixmarket.org/about/faqs/glossary (acquired 2016-05-
16).
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4.3.2 Macroeconomic determinants
Institutional quality is modeled by using a compounded index including variables from
the World Bank “Distance to Frontier”7 databank. The World Bank assesses the quality
of a range of regulatory institutions on a yearly basis to investigate the structural and
bureaucratic fundamental conditions of doing business in the region. As comprehensive
information was not available for all years included in our study we chose a select set of
variables based on relevance to our study and availability: “Starting a business”, “Getting
Credit” and “Contract Enforcement”8.
Cyclical output effects are controlled for by using GDP growth in each separate country
as a proxy. A positive coefficient is expected as a result of cyclical output on profitabil-
ity. When GDP is growing we would expect to see an increased surge in credit demand,
boosting the revenues of MFIs. Likewise, low levels of GDP growth or perhaps decline put
a constraint on the credit market limiting the profit potential.
In attempting to control for differences in the economic development between countries
we use the logarithm of GDP per capita. This measure lets us, to some extent, control for
the effect of differing developmental levels on the outcome of MFI programs as well as a
general measurement of the improvement or decline in living standards. Like the write-off
ratio variable, the expected outcome of this variable is somewhat ambiguous. We know
from previous studies (e.g. Lucas, 1990) that relatively poorer individuals have a higher
potential marginal return. However, the development level must be high enough to enable
the individuals taking part in the programs to reach that potential.The most potential lies
with the part of the poor which have already covered their basic needs and require funding
to help expand their businesses.
Interest rate is included to reflect differing funding costs between nations which in-
herently create widespread profitability opportunities. Another aspect we wish to capture
is the volatility of lending interest rates and the MFIs ability to adapt to changing condi-
tions in their respective countries. In economic regions where inflation and lending interest
rates are chronically difficult to anticipate, it will be hard to set an adjusted interest rate
accordingly. Therefore, we expect a negative causality of increasing interest rates on MFI
profitability. To further investigate this possibility, an interaction term between financial
risk and interest rate will be included in the study. Using real interest rates as a proxy
will allow us to also include the effects of inflation.
7World Bank “Distance to Frontier” http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/distance-to-frontier (acquired
2016- 05-24)
8The index was calculated by giving the variables an equal weight in a compounded index reaching the
full span of the investigated period.
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Table I: Summary statistics
Variable Definition/Measure Notation Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Expected effect
Dependent variable
Profitability
Net income/average assets ROA 502 -0.0159 0.1434 -0.9918 0.9731
Net income/average equity ROE 502 -0.0011 0.5816 -5.035 4.1377
MFI specific determinants
Credit risk Write-off ratio CRED 502 0.0262 0.0506 -0.0194 0.7001 Positive
Diversification risk Net interest income/Other operating income MIX 502 0.3632 0.1041 0.1087 1.0191 Positive
Financial risk
Equity/Assets ratio LEV 502 0.3632 0.2383 -0.5112 1 Positive
Interaction term between financial risk
and real interest rate
LEVRATE 502 0.0346 0.0699 -0.2933 0.3929 Negative
Market concentration Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) CONC 502 3002.3390 2543.4320 1 10000 ?
Legal Status
Dummy variable:
1 = if relevant institution type
0 = otherwise
BANK 502 0.2112 0.4085 0 1 Positive
NBFI 502 0.4143 0.4931 0 1 ?
NGO 502 0.253 0.4352 0 1 ?
UNION 502 0.1215 0.327 0 1 ?
Cost management Logarithm of total operating expense COST 502 14.2043 1.7155 8.8881 19.6991 Negative
Size
Logarithm of gross loan portfolio SIZE 502 15.346 1.8984 9.2262 21.9523 Positive
(Logarithm of gross loan portfolio)2 SIZE2 502 239.0975 59.9951 85.122 481.9019 Negative
Macroeconomic determinants
Institutional stability
Compounded index based on
World Bank indicators
INST 502 50.2064 12.1731 21.6133 78.94 Positive
Cyclical output GDP annual growth (%) GDP 502 0.0644 0.0325 -0.0401 0.2259 Positive
Economic development Logarithm of GDP/Capita DEV 502 6.081 0.7161 4.976 8.7144 Positive
Interest rate Real interest rate (%) RATE 502 0.0945 0.1445 -0.4231 0.5232 Negative
Summary statistics presents variable definitions and notations of measure as well as number of observations, the mean, the standard deviation, minimum
and maximum observed value registered for each variable within the sample. Source of data: World Bank Database http://data.worldbank.org/ (Acquired
2016-05-25) and MIX Market, 2016, https://reports.mixmarket.org/crossmarket - (Acquired 2016-05-15)
5 Results & Discussion
We examine MFI profitability using an unbalanced panel dataset of microfinance institu-
tions active in the SSA region during the period 2005-2014. The econometric approach
towards the models presented in section III will form the basis of our analysis conducted
in this section. The emphasis of the analysis is put on the institution specific determinants
and, in which way and at what magnitude they affect the dependent variables studied.
The first stage of the analysis is to distinguish between a fixed effects (FE) model and a
random effects (RE) model. As previously discussed, as we find it unlikely that the time-
constant unobserved factor is uncorrelated with all explanatory variables, we assume the
FE model to be favorable in describing profitability determinants. However, the Hausman
specification test9 is used as a way of formally detecting whether this reasoning seems to
hold. The test rejects the null hypothesis that differences in coefficients between RE and
FE models are not systematic when regressing on ROA, favoring the FE model. When
running the regression on ROE on the other hand, the Hausman test fails to reject. Sec-
ond, we investigate the fit of the model in relation to the data. As the F-statistics and
Wald-statistics are highly significant throughout our regressions, we can conclude that the
model fits the data quite well and will provide reasonable estimates. Third, our results
remain relatively steady across our regressions, both in terms of statistical significance and
magnitude, providing evidence of the robustness in our model.
The following part of this section presents and discusses the results of our analysis.
Table II reports the results of the estimation by the model presented above using ROA to
describe the profitability of MFIs. Table III reports our results when ROA is substituted
for ROE.
9See Table V in appendix for results.
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Table II: Return on assets regression results
Variable Pooled OLS Random effects Fixed effects
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
CRED -0.547*** -0.549*** -0.534*** -0.548*** -0.524*** -0.526***
(0.200) (0.194) (0.184) (0.172) (0.178) (0.160)
MIX -0.129** -0.156** -0.150 -0.160* -0.182 -0.172
(0.062) (0.065) (0.092) (0.091) (0.120) (0.113)
LEV 0.092** 0.147*** 0.089 0.168*** 0.070 0.181**
(0.036) (0.046) (0.063) (0.062) (0.103) (0.090)
LEVRATE -0.350* -0.646** -0.906**
(0.192) (0.330) (0.416)
CONC -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BANK -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 -0.010
(0.025) (0.025) (0.042) (0.044)
NBFI -0.041* -0.048** -0.059 -0.079*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.041) (0.043)
NGO -0.018 -0.019 -0.009 -0.020
(0.028) (0.029) (0.047) (0.049)
COST -0.084*** -0.086*** -0.117*** -0.116*** -0.166*** -0.157***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.029) (0.027)
SIZE 0.092*** 0.190*** 0.120*** 0.280*** 0.151*** 0.370***
(0.012) (0.040) (0.019) (0.064) (0.032) (0.109)
SIZE2 -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.007**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
INST 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP 0.016 0.011 -0.135 -0.146 -0.290 -0.310
(0.185) (0.184) (0.226) (0.220) (0.285) (0.274)
DEV 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.020 0.017 0.232* 0.268**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.135) (0.111)
RATE 0.026 0.158** 0.057 0.291** 0.088 0.412***
(0.035) (0.070) (0.036) (0.121) (0.060) (0.144)
Constant -0.324*** -1.080*** -0.205 -1.450*** -1.205* -3.225***
(0.092) (0.306) (0.127) (0.493) (0.657) (1.012)
Observations 502 502 502 502 502 502
R2 0.330 0.348 0.317 0.327 0.181 0.163
F-statistic 8.72 9.08 6.27 7.10
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wald-statistic 82.33 109.11
(0.000) (0.000)
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10%
level. Robust standard errors denoted in parentheses. Probability values denoted in
parentheses for the F-& Wald-statistics. Regressions (1) & (2) represent the simple
and extended model respectively, see methodology for further explanation.
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Table III: Return on equity regression results
Variable Pooled OLS Random effects Fixed effects
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
CRED -0.560 -0.560 -0.349 -0.356 0.066 0.025
(1.110) (1.111) (1.080) (1.087) (1.010) (1.055)
MIX -0.800*** -0.800*** -0.856** -0.864** -1.200* -1.220*
(0.293) (0.304) (0.435) (0.439) (0.632) (0.633)
CONC -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BANK 0.033 0.033 0.006 0.005
(0.000) (0.101) (0.153) (0.154)
NBFI -0.107 -0.107 -0.160 -0.172
(0.097) (0.095) (0.144) (0.143)
NGO 0.063 0.063 0.007 -0.002
(0.127) (0.124) (0.189) (0.187)
COST -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.279*** -0.280*** -0.412*** -0.393***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.067) (0.067) (0.137) (0.133)
SIZE 0.243*** 0.242* 0.277*** 0.374*** 0.394*** 0.810***
(0.047) (0.129) (0.062) (0.139) (0.103) (0.224)
SIZE2 0.000 -0.003 -0.013**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
INST -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.012 -0.012*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.040) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
GDP 2.170** 2.175** 1.600 1.603 0.631 0.722
(1.080) (1.080) (0.981) (0.982) (1.088) (1.073)
DEV 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.083 0.082 0.586 0.538
(0.047) (0.047) (0.066) (0.066) (0.404) (0.392)
RATE 0.130*** 0.325* 0.410** 0.407** 0.675*** 0.680***
(0.168) (0.167) (0.162) (0.162) (0.560) (0.258)
Constant -0.441 -0.434 0.035 -0.675 -2.173 -5.319**
(0.325) (0.842) (0.484) (0.898) (1.884) (2.472)
Observations 502 502 502 502 502 502
R2 0.148 0.148 0.140 0.139 0.090 0.090
F-statistic 7.47 7.26 4.73 5.10
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wald-statistic 60.78 63.66
(0.000) (0.000)
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10%
level. Robust standard errors denoted in parentheses. Probability values denoted in
parentheses for the F-& Wald-statistics. Regressions (1) & (2) represent the simple
and extended model respectively, see methodology for further explanation.
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Contrary to the findings of Flamini et al. (2009) who observed credit risk as a positive
driver of commercial banking profits in SSA, our analysis suggests the opposite for MFIs
in SSA. Credit risk is statistically significant and negatively correlated with profitability
when measured as ROA. When using ROE as the dependent variable, we observe no such
evidence. The result is not what we expected, yet not surprising. We argued previously
that MFIs able to handle a greater level risk could potentially be rewarded with greater
profits. It seems risk management is more important than risk taking in search of profits in
microfinance in SSA. Whereas commercial banking relies on collateral as security for loans,
the poor generally have very little or nothing at all to use as collateral. This fact highlights
an important factor separating microfinance from regular commercial banking. The lack of
collateral requires MFIs to approach credit risk in a unique way. MFIs typically use group
lending as method of controlling the risk involved, where a group of borrowers will engage
in a loan together, thus making each one of them responsible for their partners ability to
repay the loan (Banerjee & Duflo, 2012). The groups will typically be assembled by the
group members themselves, thus simplifying the screening process. The members of the
group have agreed to engage in a joint loan with the other members because they trust their
ability to repay the loan. Whereas collateral can decrease in value or be over leveraged, thus
endangering the security behind the loan, the approach towards microfinance in response
to a lack of collateral may actually imply that the microfinance industry is less risky and
less susceptible to collapses. Our findings of the effect of credit risk may be inconsistent
with commercial banking evidence in SSA, but are in line with the results from Dietrich &
Wanzenried (2014), who also find credit risk management to be an important explanatory
factor of profitability.
The significant and negative sign of the diversification risk measured by the ratio
of net interest income to other operating income indicates that profitable firms in SSA
typically have a larger share of income unassociated with the riskier interest based income.
Whereas we had expected the opposite effect from diversification of income activities, our
argument was based on the expectation that higher risk taking would pay off in SSA. The
findings are in line with previous findings of Demirgu¨c-Kunt & Huizinga (1998) as well as
our results from credit risk, further highlighting the need for risk management.
Leverage is only included when running the regression on ROA as it will produce a
biased result when regressing on ROE. The model presents statistically significant and
positive results of financial risk, which is in line with the expectations of leverage effect
on institutions involved in lending activities. With a higher advance ration the institution
is able to earn a higher return relative to equity. However, the increased debt incurrence
also presents a greater risk which is highlighted by the interaction term of real interest
rates and financial risk showing a negative and significant coefficient. The magnitude of
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the coefficient is quite substantial, suggesting that highly leveraged firms suffer in highly
volatile markets in terms of inflation and interest rates.
Market concentration was included in the study as a measure of the competitive
situation institutions encounter in their respective nations and measured via the individual
institutions share of national gross loan portfolio compiled into an HHI-index. The model
does not however produce any statistically significant estimator for market concentration
on neither ROA nor ROE. It is possible that in our construction of the HHI index we
are unable to construct an index which in a reliable way captures the situation, possibly
implying the actual competitive situation differs considerably to what is portrayed in the
index.
Size of the studied institutions as measured by the gross loan portfolio is positive
and statistically significant when profitability is measured as both ROA and ROE. The
results confirm our previous expectations and provide proof that MFIs are no different
than other organizations in terms of efficiency gains following economies of scale. Being
able to expand with further local offices help MFIs extend their outreach and thereby also
increase their gross loan portfolio which earns interest payments. Including the squared
variable of gross loan portfolio provides evidence that some diseconomies of scale do exist
among MFIs in SSA. However, as the coefficient is very small, a significant change in the
size of the institution is required to have an observable effect on profitability.
Along with size, cost management is also highly significant when regressing on both
dependent variables. The negative correlation between costs and profitability confirms
what we previously expected and comes as no surprise. Our findings further support the
results of Flamini et al. (2009) as well as Hartarska (2005). Cost management is of critical
importance in any business. However, in microfinance it is especially important. Not only
is cost management a necessity to be profitable, but also to achieve what microfinance
originally set out to do, reduce poverty. By depressing total operating costs and costs per
loan, MFIs can offer more competitively priced loan services. Lower interest rates will make
the institution more attractive whilst simultaneously lowering the risk of default since the
total amount to be repaid is lower than what was previously the case. A lower cost per loan
will also allow the MFI to provide cheap credit to more people. The situation is potentially
mutually beneficial where MFIs can benefit from higher profits as credit is available to
more people who in turn could use the credit as an escape out of the struggle of poverty.
Recapping to Roberts (2013) study which found that profit orientated MFIs tended to
seek higher profits by hiring highly skilled top level executives who naturally required
high salary. Interest rates would as a consequence be higher and all above mentioned
advantages of cost management would be lost. Cost management is no easy endeavor;
only highly skilled managers will be able to depress costs to a minimum level while still
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maintaining a certain degree of operational size. Yet, acquiring that level of skill comes at
a price. Thus, there has to be a balance between depressing costs and the level of spending
to achieve that goal.
The results from the macroeconomic determinants are quite surprising. Real interest
rate has a highly significant effect on profitability while economic development presents
relatively weak yet significant results when regressing on ROA. We do not observe any
evidence of cyclical output and institutional quality significantly affecting our profitability
measures. Changes in inflation or lending interest rates will affect funding costs, especially
for those institutions which rely heavily on external funding in terms of debt. Being able
to foresee these changes will be crucial for the sustainability of their business. The ability
to forecast inflation expectations and interest rate changes is always a tricky endeavor.
Of our dataset of 502 observations, a majority come from six nations; Ethiopia, Kenya,
Madagascar, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda. Analyzing data from these nations shows
the volatility of inflation as well as real interest rates10. As real interest rates significantly
influence profits, it leads us to assume managers in MFIs are able to correctly foresee and
adjust their own lending rates accordingly. This is quite impressive when considering the
development during the observed period. Inflation along with real interest rates (affected
by inflation) fluctuates violently during our observed period, Nigeria even observing 103%
inflation in 2010. We expected increased real interest rates to negatively affect profits
following the increased costs of funding faced by highly leveraged institutions. As the
average equity/assets rate in our dataset is 0.36 (i.e. only 36% of their total assets are
funded by shareholders equity) we would expect their profits to drastically drop following
a sharp increase in interest rates. One possibility why this is not the case is that highly
leveraged MFIs might receive their funding from private or foreign lenders which set their
rates independent of the real interest rate in the respective country.
GDP growth and GDP/capita reflects which state the economy was in during the
observed period and where they started out from, i.e. recession or economic boom and
how poor they were. A booming economy will allow job opportunities to arise for the poor
working in e.g. construction as well as those which are self-employed and run small busi-
ness. The demand for credit is likely to develop in accordance with the current economic
development, as the startup of new businesses as well as the undertaking of larger projects
tends to require an initial increase in capital. Yet cyclical output does not significantly
affect MFI profits in our study and only sparse evidence is presented supporting economic
development being a viable estimator of profitability. The lack of evidence of developmen-
10See figures I & II in appendix for inflation and real interest rate development in above mentioned
countries during 2005-2014.
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tal determinants significantly affecting MFI profitability might be interpreted as proof that
the financial expansion of a country is somewhat disconnected from the development of the
domestic population. We can interpret this in relation to the development of ROE/ROA
and GDP per capita presented in Figure III and IV11 as the success of MFIs being some-
what independent of the macroeconomic movements of the global economy. Investing in
MFIs could therefore prove to be a great diversification opportunity as the industry is
perhaps somewhat dislocated from the “normal” economy.
Broadening the perspective of our results, three determinants emerge as the most
contributing to success in microfinance in SSA in terms of significance and magnitude; risk
management, cost management and institution size. These findings lead us to the second
part of what we set out to accomplish with this paper; which organization structure would
most likely flourish in the microfinance industry in SSA, or to put it differently, which
organization structure would be the most beneficial to the microfinance industry in SSA.
The two differing perspectives are not mutually exclusive in our view; profitability does not
necessarily have to come at the expense of limited poverty elimination. Perhaps the key to
the reincarnation of microfinance as an investment vehicle and what has kept it from fully
blossoming is the lack of efficient organizations within the industry. Analyzing the three
main determinants further, we would typically find them in large global organizations.
Perhaps having the commercial/investment bankers of the global finance industry play a
bigger role in microfinance could provide the industry with the expertise and size that
seems to be needed. Obviously the size component is quite explanatory in this aspect.
As previously described we observe both economies of scale as well as diseconomies of
scale, therefore we cannot conclude bigger is always better since the marginal gain is
diminishing. At a given size, the marginal gain of expanding would be less than the loss
that follows. However, as the marginal loss is significantly smaller than gain, it points
in favor of larger organizations operating in microfinance in SSA. Using their expertise
already within the organization, a large global organization could apply their ordinary
business approach to depress costs per loan, with the potential benefits that follow as
described earlier in the results, as well as adapt their risk management approach to the
special needs of microfinance.
6 Conclusions
With growing interest for MFIs as an investment vehicle for the west to reach the high
marginal returns of the poor the controversy of profit opposing development is feeding
an ongoing global debate. In this study we have taken a starting point in the view that
an optimal distribution of capital in the world will help fuel both economic gains for the
11See appendix
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investors as well as developmental progress for the receiving nations. Continuing on that
view we have investigated what marks the most successful examples of such investment
opportunities.
The aim of this paper consisted of two parts. First, we set out to allocate the determi-
nants of profitability among microfinance institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Second, with
the findings from our first question, we proceeded to contemplate in which organization
type we could locate these parameters and therefore could prosper in the microfinance
industry in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using our self-compiled dataset of unbalanced panel data
from 22 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa during the period 2005-2014, we find MFI specific
characteristics to be the main determinants of MFI profitability. Among them three stand
out; risk management, cost management and size of the institution. We find some con-
vincing evidence of macroeconomic determinants significantly affecting MFI profitability,
although we acknowledge our model may be limited in its ability to capture such a com-
plex economic environment as Sub-Saharan Africa. Given our findings from the model, we
conclude that an entry of large global financial institutions in the microfinance industry in
SSA would most likely be of a mutually beneficial nature. Were they would be provided
with a large potentially diversified market and the prospect of large profits. Whilst also
contributing to the microfinance industry, using their expertise within the main parameters
in our study to increase their outreach by providing cheap credit, and thereby assisting in
the process of eliminating global poverty.
Conducting our study of MFIs on an international level covering Sub-Saharan Africa
presented both opportunities and challenges. First, being conducted on a regional level,
the study produces interesting results applicable on a broader level than if we had only
observed a single country. However, the cross-country aspect also infers there is a risk that
national differences in measurement and transparency of data are given a greater role. More
specifically we noticed a larger fall-out of observations from some nations when processing
the dataset; other nations however, remained to a greater degree resulting in stronger
representation in the final data. As previously mentioned, six countries constitute a clear
majority of our observations of 22 countries in total, potentially resulting in findings of the
study being more applicable on some countries than others in the studied region. Second, as
we have not limited our study based on a certain level of reporting accuracy/transparency,
the reliability of the data in our study may be questioned, a flaw which we are fully aware
of and accepted in order to maintain a reasonable number of observations.
This study contributes to the literature by serving as a first introduction to future
investment analysis of MFIs and provides some evidence as to what aspects play a role
on a regional level. Further research may expand the field by investigating these aspects
on a national level; thereby offering more specific results for investors and policymakers
interested in a specific country.
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8 Appendix
Table IV: Observations per country
Country Observations Years observed
Angola 6 2005-2007; 2009; 2010; 2014
Burundi 8 2007-2012; 2014
Cameroon 13 2005-2007
Central African Republic 1 2007
Chad 1 2007
Democratic Republic of the Congo 28 2006-2014
Ethiopia 53 2005-2008
The Gambia 5 2007-2010
Kenya 71 2005-2014
Liberia 4 2011-2013
Madagascar 49 2005-2014
Malawi 25 2006-2014
Mozambique 32 2005-2014
Namibia 1 2008
Nigeria 42 2005-2014
Rwanda 22 2005-2010
Sierra Leone 10 2007-2012; 2014
South Africa 13 2005-2010; 2012; 2013
Swaziland 4 2006-2008; 2011
Tanzania 40 2005-2014
Uganda 57 2005-2014
Zambia 17 2006-2010; 2012-2014
Observations per country presents the number of observations recorded for each
country and also which years that are represented in the dataset. Source - MIX
Market, 2016, https://reports.mixmarket.org/crossmarket - (Acquired 2016-05-15)
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Table V: Hausman specification test
Return on assets
Coefficients
b B (b-B)
Fixed Random Difference S.E.
CRED -0.526 -0.548 0.022 0.042
MIX -0.172 -0.160 -0.012 0.037
LEV 0.181 0.168 0.013 0.033
LEVRATE -0.906 -0.646 -0.260 0.119
CONC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
COST -1.568 -0.116 -1.452 0.014
SIZE 0.370 0.280 0.090 0.029
SIZE2 -0.007 -0.005 -0.002 0.001
INST -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001
GDP -0.310 -0.146 -0.164 0.099
DEV 0.268 0.017 0.251 0.093
RATE 0.412 0.291 0.121 0.053
Test: H0: Differences in coefficients are not systematic
χ2 (11) = 32.59
P >χ2 = 0.0006
Return on equity
Coefficients
b B (b-B)
Fixed Random Difference S.E.
CRED 0.025 -0.356 0.381 0.270
MIX -1.224 -0.864 -0.360 0.256
CONC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
COST -0.393 -0.280 -0.113 0.083
SIZE 0.810 0.374 0.436 0.192
SIZE2 -0.013 -0.003 -0.010 0.006
INST -0.012 -0.002 -0.010 0.008
GDP 0.722 1.603 -0.881 0.650
DEV 0.538 0.082 0.456 0.505
RATE 0.680 0.407 0.273 0.235
Test: H0: Differences in coefficients are not systematic
χ2 (9) = 12.03
P >χ2 = 0.2119
Hausman specification test present the results of regressions with fixed
versus random effects.
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Figure I: The figure depicts inflation development (%) from the six most observed coun-
tries in our dataset during the analyzed period of 2005-2014. Source - World Bank Database
http://data.worldbank.org/ (Acquired 2016-05-25)
Figure II: The figure depicts real interest rate development (%) from five of the most
observed countries in our dataset during the analyzed period of 2005-2014. Source - World
Bank Database http://data.worldbank.org/ (Acquired 2016-05-25)
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Figure III: The figure depicts average ROA and ROE development of MFIs in SSA
between 2005-2014. Source - https://reports.mixmarket.org/crossmarket (Acquired 2016-
05-25)
Figure IV: The figure depicts average GDP development (%) in Sub-Saharan Africa
during the analyzed period of 2005-2014. Due to lack of observations, Angola and Somalia
are not included, observations from South Sudan are missing from 2005-2008 and from
Eritrea 2012-2014. Source - World Bank Database http://data.worldbank.org/ (Acquired
2016-05-25)
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